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We study how domestic politics a¤ected the decisions of countries to adhere to the
classical gold standard. Using a variety of econometric techniques and controlling for a
wide range of economic factors, we demonstrate that political constraints were important
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1 Introduction
Todays highly globalized world, where goods, money, information and ideas can cross borders at
low cost, has been the result of systematic e¤orts over decades to foster international economic
integration. In recent years, however, the tide of public opinion has started to turn against
globalization, as the benets of unrestricted trade and capital ows do not appear to be shared
equally between countries, or even within countries between socioeconomic groups. Recent de-
velopments, such as the Eurozone crisis, the decision of Britain to leave the European Union,
and the political backlash against large multi-country trade agreements and other attempts to
lower trade barriers in di¤erent parts of the world are all illustrative of this turn.
According to Rodrik (2011) the tensions created by globalization can be understood as a
trilemma: out of the three goals of national self-determination, economic globalization and a
democratic political system, at most two can be pursued at the same time. This paper provides
the rst systematic exploration of these tensions during the rst era of globalization, a period
also characterized by increasing speeds of communication and transportation, rapidly growing
trade ows, and high levels of nancial integration across borders (ORourke & Williamson,
1999). In the context of this early globalization era, we focus on the tension created between
the democratic nature of domestic political institutions and the spread and stability of the gold
standard, the prevailing monetary system and an essential pillar of global economic integration
of the era (Bordo & Schwartz, 1984; Gallarotti, 1995).
The classical gold standard, as the system is often referred to, emerged as the global monetary
system after 1870 and came to an abrupt end in 1914 with the outbreak of the First World War.
The resurrected version that was established during the interwar period did not succeed in
bringing stability to the world economy. In fact, the interwar gold standard was a key factor
behind the severity of the Great Depression and it e¤ectively only lasted from 1925 to 1936. One
of the reasons for the failure of the gold standard during the interwar period was the fact that
policy makers after 1918 faced increased power of trade unions and a more broadly enfranchised
population. External stability, thus, had to be sacriced in order to pursue domestic goals and
this undermined the credibility of countriespromises to keep their currency convertible into gold
(Eichengreen, 1992).
The spread of democratic institutions, however, was a process that had started well before
1914. According to Huntington (1991) the rst wave of democratization can be traced back to
the 1820s when the rst calls for su¤rage extensions began in many western countries. This
process continued throughout the nineteenth century, largely in tandem with the emergence of
the gold standard as a global monetary system. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the
share of countries world-wide that were part of the gold standard system and the global average
of the polity score from the Polity IV project, a typical measure for democratization.
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[Insert Figure 1 around here]
This gure presents a paradox: if the spread of democratic institutions eroded the stability
of the gold standard, as is often argued for the interwar period, one would expect some signs
of erosion well before 1914. Perhaps this stability had indeed been eroded and the fact that
none of the core countries decided to suspend the gold standard was largely a consequence of
the relative economic stability of the years before the First World War.1 In fact, the benign
picture of the stability of the classical gold standard may be deceptive and only viable when
compared to the monetary turbulence of the interwar period. Crises of convertibility under the
classical gold standard were not uncommon, especially in countries on the periphery of the world
economy (Mitchener & Weidenmier, 2015; Mitchener & Pina, 2016), and forced several countries
to abandon the gold standard already before 1914.2 The gold standard was also contested in
major economies, such as the United States in the 1890s, where a return to bimetallism was
seriously considered as an alternative.3
These observations raise the question whether countries that suspended the gold standard
before 1914 did so in response to increased domestic political pressure, as during the interwar
period. A similar question can also be raised for the decision of countries to adopt the gold
standard. Were the necessary monetary reforms easier in countries where policy makers faced
weaker political constraints and, hence, had more degrees of freedom in determining economic
policies?
These are the questions that we address in this paper. Specically, we focus on the years
between 1860 and 1913 and investigate whether the decisions of countries to adopt or suspend
the gold standard can be partially explained by the democratic or non-democratic nature of
their political systems. For this purpose, we construct a data set containing information for 30
countries regarding gold standard adherence at an annual frequency between 1860 and 1913. The
database includes information on several key economic variables such as GDP per capita, debt
levels and trade ows, as well as di¤erent political indicators that reect each countrys form of
government. The countries in our database cover all major economies of the time and include
all documented cases of pre-1914 suspensions of the gold standard.
Using this data set we assess the importance of the link between gold standard adherence and
political institutions employing a variety of econometric techniques. For our baseline analysis
we employ a dynamic discrete choice model based on which we compare the role of political
institutions relative to other factors in determining the probability of gold standard adherence.
In this context we provide clear evidence that more democratic countries were, other things equal,
1This is the view presented by De Cecco (1974): [T]he tree felled by the [1914] crisis was already rotten(p.
128).
2This happened for instance in Argentina (1876 and 1885), Greece (1885), Portugal (1891) and Chile (1898).
3According to Rodrik (2017), opposition to the Gold Standard in the United States during the 1880s constituted
the "rst self-consciously populist movement."
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less likely to adhere to the gold standard. When we measure democracy based on the polity score,
as we do in Figure 1, we nd that a one standard deviation increase in democratization decreases
the likelihood of gold standard adherence by about seven percent. This e¤ect is conditional on
other signicant determinants of gold standard adherence such as the level of GDP per capita,
involvement in wars or the extent of trade with other gold standard countries.
A deeper look at the mechanism behind our results reveals that the negative relationship
between democratic political institutions and adherence to the gold standard is largely driven by
one particular aspect of democratic politics: the degree of political competition. Other aspects
such as the extent of institutional constraints faced by the executive, on the other hand, appear
less relevant. Comparing the results across di¤erent groups of countries, we nd that the impor-
tance of these domestic political constraints was larger for peripheral countries. Distinguishing
further the determinants of gold standard adoptions from those of suspensions, applying a Cox
proportional hazard model for each decision, we nd the hypothesized negative e¤ect of demo-
cratic politics to operate in both cases. Yet, the evidence statistically appears stronger in the
case of adoptions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we outline the key
considerations faced by countries in their decision whether or not to adopt and adhere to the gold
standard. In the context of this discussion we highlight the role of domestic politics and develop
in more detail the rationale behind our main hypothesis that democratic political constraints
negatively a¤ected adherence to the classical gold standard. Section 3 presents the approach
based on which we conduct our analysis, while section 4 discusses the sources that we use for our
data set. The main results of our empirical analysis can be found in section 5. Section 6 provides
a series of robustness checks on our main results. The nal section summarizes our results and
draws some broader conclusions.
2 Factors Determining Gold Standard Adoption and Sus-
pension
The emergence of the classical gold standard as a global monetary system is often viewed in
the literature as a process of di¤usion, ignited by the decision of the newly unied Germany
to switch its monetary standard from silver to gold in 1871 (Gallarotti, 1993). Before that,
the only countries using the gold standard were Britain, some members of the British empire,
and Portugal. Following the German decision, most of the economically advanced countries in
Western Europe and North America gradually adopted the gold standard during the 1870s, while
several peripheral countries followed suit during the 1880s and 1890s.4
4See Friedman (1990), Gallarotti (1993), Eichengreen and Flandreau (1996), Flandreau (1996), and Meissner
(2005) for further details.
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Overall this process was facilitated by the improvements in monetary technology which came
about during the nineteenth century and which allowed for higher-quality token coinage (Redish,
1990). This eliminated the need to use precious metal like silver or copper for small transac-
tions and enabled a monometallic standard based on gold. Beyond these common technological
developments, though, the decision of individual countries to adhere to the gold standard was
inuenced by various factors, some of which were of an economic nature and some of which were
not. Below we briey outline the most important ones.
2.1 Economic Factors
First of all, trade considerations were an important factor behind a countrys decision whether
or not to adopt the gold standard. As shown by López-Córdova and Meissner (2003), trade was
higher among countries that were on the gold standard. Thus, a countrys incentive to join the
gold standard would increase as more of its trade partners participated in the system. Such
incentives were, according to Meissner (2005), one of the key drivers of the di¤usion of the gold
standard after 1871.
In addition to trade ows, capital ows were also facilitated by the gold standard. As the
system limited the ability of governments to use monetary nance to cover budget decits,
adherence to the gold standard was a credible signal that a government was committed to sound
scal policy. This good housekeeping seal of approval,provided by the gold standard, according
to Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Rocko¤ (1996), permitted the countrys access to
foreign capital.5
Another factor that made the gold standard more attractive was the increasing value of
commercial transactions. As silver money is too bulky for large transactions, switching to a
gold standard would reduce the costs of monetary transactions. For this reason, as argued by
Eichengreen and Flandreau (1996), countries that were economically more advanced had stronger
interests in adopting the gold standard.
Beyond these benets, the gold standard system also implied signicant costs for participat-
ing countries. First and foremost was that balance of payments decits could not be absorbed
through an adjustment of the nominal exchange rate, as with any xed exchange rate regime. In
case of sudden current or capital account reversals, therefore, strict adherence to convertibility
would necessitate either more restrictive credit conditions or temporary deation. This consid-
eration was particularly important for peripheral countries, which were subject to large current
account gyrations and where capital account movements were mostly determined by conditions
in a small number of capital-exporting countries.6
5Whether or not adherence to the gold standard materially a¤ected borrowing cost has been the subject of a
long academic debate. See also Flandreau and Zumer (2004) for an alternative viewpoint.
6See Ford (1962), Llona Rodríguez (1997) or Reis (2000) for illustrations of how these balance of payments
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A second important cost was related to the restrictions imposed upon scal and monetary
policy. As with any monetary regime that involves a xed exchange rate and free capital ows,
the money supply is largely left beyond the control of policy makers.7 Similarly, the restriction on
scal policy, already discussed above, further limited the ability of the government to stimulate
economic activity in the event of an economic downturn or to use monetary nance to cover
decits.
A third notable drawback of the classical gold standard was that, for much of the time, that
the system generated prolonged deation. As gold provided the basis for the money supply in all
participating countries, this meant that the rate of money growth was limited by the growth of
the worlds gold stock. In the absence of large gold ndings, therefore, a growing world economy
can only be facilitated by a secular decline in prices, as was particularly the case between 1873
and 1896 (Capie & Wood, 1997).
2.2 Political Factors
Apart from the aforementioned economic factors, political factors were also important in the
decision of countries to adopt the gold standard. Gallarotti (1993), for example, highlights how
the German choice to replace its silver-backed currency with the gold mark was largely motivated
by an e¤ort to rival the hegemony of the British pound. This rationale was not limited to the
German hegemonic aspirations. Many countries would have perceived negatively the loss of
prestige associated with the use of a silver standard or inconvertible money. As Ford (1962)
observes, this consideration was particularly important for the wealthier countries of Western
Europe and North America.
Geopolitical considerations also inuenced these decisions. Countries allied with Britain, such
as Portugal or Japan, had an interest in sharing Britains monetary standard. At the same time,
Britain had also an interest in keeping its allies on the gold standard and tried to facilitate that,
to the extent possible.8
More importantly the option of adopting the gold standard, however, should be seen as
a fundamental choice between external and internal stability. This is because many of the
benets of the gold standard, such as exchange rate stability and access to foreign capital,
would end up accruing to the governments and a relatively small share of the population, active
swings a¤ected the gold standard in Argentina, Chile and Portugal respectively.
7While in practice adherence to the gold standard placed substantially more restrictions on monetary policy
than an inconvertible paper currency, even under the gold standard central banks had some room for discretionary
policy. This was rstly because the costs of international gold arbitrage implied a narrow range of uctuation for
exchange rates and secondly due to the so-called gold devices: the tools and tricks that governments or central
banks used to maintain gold convertibility. See Bloomeld (1959) for more on these gold devices. Bazot, Bordo,
and Monnet (2016) study the use of gold devices in detail for the Banque de France.
8See Pittaluga and Seghezza (2016) for further details on how these interests mattered in the case of Japan
and Ferguson and Schularick (2006) for how they applied in the case of British colonies and dominions.
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in sectors linked with international trade and investment. On the other hand, the domestic
burdens associated with strict gold standard adherence would be borne by wider shares of the
population.9 Recognizing that adherence to the gold standard is tantamount to choosing external
over internal economic stability, it is evident that the gold standard would be viewed as a less
favorable monetary regime, other things equal, in more democratic countries. Put di¤erently, as
a country becomes more democratic, the median voter will shift increasingly towards individuals
that put more weight on domestic economic stability.
Our main hypothesis stems from this rationale, which combines the median voter theorem
with the view of the gold standard as a choice of external over internal economic stability. Beyond
that, though, there is another way in which the extension of democratic institutions can make
adoption or maintenance of the gold standard less likely. The process of democratization imposes
further institutional constraints on the policy choices that can be made by the government. These
constraints may make it harder for the government to adopt and adhere to the gold standard, as
the adoption often required major institutional and legal overhauls.10 The relative importance
of these two alternative mechanisms is something that we explore in the context of our analysis
below.
The nature of the relationship between domestic political institutions and gold standard ad-
herence has never been systematically analyzed for the classical gold standard era. It has only
been explored in a number of related studies in the context of the interwar period. Eichengreens
(1992) classic study on the instability of the interwar gold standard, for example, highlights the
role of increased domestic political tensions, although it does not explore this relationship quanti-
tatively.11 Simmons (1994) shows that devaluations under the interwar gold standard were more
likely for democracies, though she does not nd this e¤ect to be statistically signicant across
specications. Other political factors are shown to matter as well: central bank independence
from the government made devaluation less likely, whereas cabinet instability made this more
likely. Three more recent studies of suspensions of the interwar gold standard  Wolf and Yousef
(2007), Wandschneider (2008), and Wolf (2008)  all nd evidence that the risk of suspension
was higher for countries that were more democratic. In a similar vein, Bearce and Hallerberg
(2011) show that for the post-Bretton Woods era, democratization is negatively related to de
facto exchange rate xity. In this case, however, the decision of maintaining a xed exchange rate
is a much less encompassing choice of monetary regime compared to the decision to participate
9Following Gallarotti (1993) (pp. 28-29), it can be said with a slight risk of overgeneralization that indus-
trialists, bankers, and other urban interest groups were more in favor of the gold standard, whereas debtors,
agriculturalists, and landowners would be relatively more in favor of a more inationary monetary regime.
10Kemmerer (1916) o¤ers an inside look at what these overhauls entailed for currency reforms in India, Mexico,
Porto Rico, the Philippines and the Straits Settlements.
11In particular Eichengreen (1992) highlights two reasons for the contrasting experiences of the classical and
interwar gold standards: the lack of credibility due to changing domestic political conditions and the absence of
international cooperation after 1914, especially between central banks.
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in the gold standard.12
These results for the interwar and post-Bretton-Woods eras, nevertheless, raise the question
whether a similar mechanism operated during the classical gold standard era. The existing liter-
ature on the classical gold standard, though, has yet to explored this question. While Meissner
(2005), and Esteves and Ploeckl (2016) investigate the role of di¤erent factors in a¤ecting the
choice of countries to participate in the gold standard, their analyses focus on economic factors.
Recent work by Mitchener and Weidenmier (2015), and Mitchener and Pina (2016) looks at
how global markets perceived the probability of di¤erent countries abandoning the classical gold
standard based on currency risk spreads. They show that for peripheral countries these spreads
were sizeable and that they were following the movements in the prices of the main commodities
exported by these countries, but they do not link the behavior of these spreads with domestic
political institutions.
3 Empirical Strategy
Having summarized the main factors determining the adherence to the classical gold standard,
our aim is to evaluate their relative importance over the period from 1860 to 1913 and to assess
more specically the role of democratic political institutions. For this purpose, we construct a
data set with annual information on the monetary regime of 30 major economies of the time as
well as various economic and political variables. Based on our data set we estimate the e¤ect of
these explanatory variables on the probability of adherence to the gold standard over this period.
For our baseline analysis, we model gold standard adherence as a binary choice: in every year,
every country makes a decision whether to adhere to the gold standard or not. We then estimate
the adherence probability conditional on the choice made the previous year and the lagged values
of the explanatory variables. We do so as a countrys choice regarding its monetary regime is
highly inertial and changes in that regime will take time to be implemented. Thus, the choice
made in a given year will depend crucially on the conditions prevailing in the previous year.13
Using lagged values of the explanatory variables also avoids biases due to reverse causality.
Formally, we estimate the following dynamic binary choice model,
Pr(GSi;t = 1jXi;t 1;GSi;t 1) = F (Xi;t 1+GSi;t 1 + it); (1)
where GSi;t is an indicator variable equal to one if country i is on the gold standard in year t
12As Flandreau, Cacheux, Zumer, Dornbusch, and Honohan (1998) argue, the most tting contemporary parallel
to the gold standard would be either a target zone or a currency board.
13In Section 6 we also explore the robustness of our results to alternative lag structures. Although the use
of rst lags appears as most appropriate, considering contemporaneous values, second lags, or third lags of the
explanatory variables does not qualitatively change our results.
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and zero otherwise.14 Xi;t 1 is the vector of explanatory variables and i;t is a stochastic error
term, which we cluster at the country level. For the cumulative probability distribution F (:)
we consider three di¤erent alternatives and estimate equation 1 as either a linear probability, a
probit or a logit model. In all cases we are interested in the vector of coe¢ cients  which captures
the conditional e¤ects of the di¤erent explanatory variables on the probability of adherence to
the gold standard in each year.
The main advantages of using the model of equation 1 are the relatively straightforward
interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients and the use of all available observations in the esti-
mation. Beyond estimating the probability of adhering to the gold standard, though, it may be
instructive to estimate separately the determinants of adopting or suspending the gold standard
in any given year and to check whether these determinants are symmetric. With that in mind,
we also estimate the following duration model:
h(tjXi;t 1) = h0(t)  expfXi;t 1 + itg: (2)
Here h(tjXi;t 1) reects the instantaneous probability or hazard rate of a particular event occur-
ring, given the baseline hazard h0(t) and the lagged value of the vector of explanatory variables
Xi;t 1. In our setup, these events are either the adoption or the suspension of the gold standard.
i;t is a stochastic error term, which is again clustered at the country level. In line with previ-
ous literature, we estimate equation 2 as a Cox proportional hazard model, rather than a more
restrictive parametric model.
Duration models similar to that of equation 2 have been used in the literature by Meissner
(2005) to study the adoption of the classical gold standard and by Wolf and Yousef (2007),
Wandschneider (2008), and Wolf (2008) to study the suspension of the interwar gold standard.
Yet, in all of these papers the focus of the analysis is either on the adoption or on the suspension
decision. Hence, a formal comparison of the determinants of these two processes is still absent
from the literature.
4 Data
As already mentioned above, for our empirical analysis we use data for 30 countries covering the
period from 1860 to 1913. The exact list of countries that we include in our analysis is reported
in Table A1 of the Appendix. The inclusion of countries in the data set was largely based on data
availability and on the condition that the country was de facto an independent polity during the
years covered in the data.
Classifying adherence to the gold standard in each year is not always clear-cut, since in
14In Section 6 we also consider alternative indicator variables which capture also adherence to silver and
bimetallic standards.
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practice the implementation of this system di¤ered slightly from country to country. For the
purpose of our analysis we consider a country to be on the gold standard if its currency is freely
convertible into gold and if there are no signicant barriers to importing or exporting gold, or
other nancial assets.15 The exact years during which each country is considered to have adhered
to the gold standard can also be found in Table A1. Based on the same two criteria we also
classify countries which were on a silver or a bimetallic standard. The exact sources based on
which we classify monetary regimes are provided in the Appendix.
To measure the democratic nature of each countrys political institutions, we take the ag-
gregate polity score, reported by the Polity IV project, as our baseline measure. We do so, not
just because this is the most widely used indicator, but also because it is a composite indicator
reecting various characteristics of domestic political institutions. This enables us to also assess
separately the extent to which the di¤erent sub-components of the polity score are related to
gold standard adherence. As an alternative to this analysis we consider the binary democracy
indicator constructed by Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013). This allows us to explore the relative
robustness of our results to the choice between binary and ordinal measures of democracy.
Beyond measures of political institutions, in our analysis we include two other key geopolitical
variables. The rst of these is a dummy variable which equals one if a country is involved in
any kind of war in a given year. The other is a dummy variable which equals one if a country
has some type of formal alliance with Britain in a given year. Both variables are coded based
on data provided by the Correlates of War project (Gibler, 2009; Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).
The inclusion of the war dummy is driven by the observation that outbreaks of war were often
accompanied by scal and nancial crises, and these eventually could lead to suspensions of
the gold standard. The inclusion of the British ally dummy is motivated by the fact that the
adherence of some countries to the gold standard was facilitated by the British government in
exchange for geopolitical services, as already discussed in Section 2.2.
In terms of economic variables, rst of all, we control for GDP per capita using data from
Maddison (2013), as we expect wealthier countries to be more likely to adhere to the gold
standard, in line with the discussion in Section 2. We further control for population using data
from Maddison (2003) This is based on the argument of Eichengreen and Flandreau (1996) that
the adoption of the gold standard would be easier for smaller countries, since these did not
have to take into account the general equilibrium e¤ects on global gold- and silver markets of
a potential change of the monetary system. Moreover, we include in our analysis the ratio of
government debt to GDP from Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011), as countries with higher government
15In recent years, various authors have classied gold standard adherence using these or similar sets of criteria.
These include Flandreau and Zumer (2004), Meissner (2005), O¢ cer (2008), and Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011). In
most cases these classications and ours are all aligned. In the few cases where there is disagreement across the
di¤erent authors, we check carefully our classication against primary sources or country-specic studies. Further
details about this are provided in the Appendix.
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debt were less likely to be on the gold standard, since the temptation to default or to rely on
seigniorage would be higher and their ability to attract additional foreign capital would be lower.
Adherence to the gold standard was also closely linked with the conditions in the balance of
payments of each country. Current account reversals were often the prelude to suspensions of
convertibility. As current account information is not widely available for most countries pre-1914,
we follow the literature and employ data on trade balances, which can be measured consistently
across countries. To capture trade linkages, we further consider two additional variables in our
analysis. Firstly, we include the overall level of trade openness, measured as the sum of exports
and imports over nominal GDP, following Klasing and Milionis (2014). We expect this ratio to be
positively associated with gold standard adherence, since more open countries will nd exchange
rate stability more important. Secondly, using additional information on bilateral trade from
Fouquin and Hugot (2016), we can measure the share of trade of a particular country is with
other gold standard countries. The higher this share was, as emphasized by Meissner (2005), the
larger would be the likelihood of a country wanting to be a member of the gold standard.
In our robustness analysis, we will also estimate a version of the model that includes three
further explanatory variables. These are the ination rate from Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011), the
central bank coverage ratio, measured as in Accominotti, Flandreau, and Rezzik (2011), and a
dummy variable indicating whether a country had a central bank or bank of issue in the rst
place, based on information from the League of Nations (1942). Though these measures have
often been used in similar studies, we choose not to include them in our baseline estimations
for two main reasons. Firstly, adding these further controls substantially decreases the number
of observations that can be included, since information for these variables can not be found for
all countries and years. Secondly, the evolution of these variables over time may end up being
direct outcomes of the decision to participate in the gold standard. For each of the explanatory
variables Table A2 in the Appendix summarizes the key information by listing for each variable
the main source of data and by providing some key descriptive statistics.
5 Main Results
Table 1 presents the estimation results for the dynamic binary choice model of equation 1 specied
either as a linear probability model, a probit model or a logit model. The exact model is indicated
on the top of each column. In all cases the estimation is based on the sample of countries
listed in Table A1 in the Appendix. The sample covers the years from 1860 up to 1913 at an
annual frequency with the dependent variable indicating adherence to the gold standard in each
respective year. This is regressed on various explanatory variables including the gold standard
adherence indicator lagged by one year. The specication also includes a full set of decade xed
e¤ects to control for global trends in the evolution of the gold standard system.
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Looking across the three distinct econometric setups, rst of all, we see that the coe¢ cient
estimates for the lagged gold standard dummy are positive, large, and highly statistically signi-
cant. This reects the high degree of persistence in the gold standard as monetary arrangement.
Once a country has decided to adopt the gold standard in given period, it is very likely to main-
tain it during the next period. Controlling for that e¤ect, however, we see a clear negative and
statistically signicant coe¢ cient for the polity score in all three columns. This suggests that
conditional on all other control variables higher values for the polity score for a given country in
a given year, which reect more open and democratic political institutions, lower the probability
of the country adopting the gold standard during the next period or increase the probability of
suspending it if it has already joined.
Turning to the estimates for the other control variables, we see that the level of GDP per
capita and the war dummy also have a statistically signicant e¤ect on the probability of adhering
to the gold standard. As expected, the estimated probability is increasing in the countrys level
of economic development and is reduced by the outbreak of war. For all other control variables
the estimated coe¢ cients that we obtain are statistically insignicant. This suggests that their
impact on triggering a change in the monetary arrangement for our sample countries into or out
of the gold standard from one year to the next was rather limited. Nevertheless, the coe¢ cients
that we obtain in all cases have the expected sign. They suggest that adherence to the gold
standard was more likely if a country had an alliance with Britain, a larger population size, a
lower debt to GDP ratio, greater openness in terms of exports and imports, more extensive trade
with the set of countries already on the gold standard, and a more positive trade balance.16
To properly assess the relative importance of all these variables in determining the probability
of a country adhering to the gold standard, we compute the corresponding marginal e¤ects in
each of the three econometric setups. The computed marginal e¤ects, which are reported in Table
2, indicate by how much the probability of adhering to the gold standard increases following an
increase in each respective regressor by one standard deviation from the mean while all other
regressors remain at their mean values. This is with the exception of the three regressors which
are dummy variables: the lagged gold standard dummy, the war dummy and the British ally
dummy. In these cases we report instead the result of an increase in the value of the dummy
from zero to one.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
16We should note here that the statistical insignicance of the rest of the control variables is not driven by
their high correlation. Pairwise correlation coe¢ cients between our control variables do not exceed 60%. Also,
dropping some of the signicant controls from the specication does not alter the statistical signicance for the
other controls.
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As the reported e¤ects clearly highlight, the strongest predictor of a countrys status regarding
the gold standard in a given year is its status in the previous year. This result is not surprising
given the costs involved in the adoption or the suspension of the gold standard. The magnitude of
this e¤ect also illustrates the importance of controlling for the lagged value of the gold standard
dummy, given its high degree of persistence.
Comparing the computed marginal e¤ects for the remaining variables we see that the second
strongest predictor of gold standard adherence is the level of GDP per capita, followed by the
war dummy. These e¤ects appear in line with the qualitative observations by Eichengreen and
Flandreau (1996). Following these e¤ects in terms of their order of magnitude comes the e¤ect
of our main variable of interest, the polity score. Specically, we nd that an increase in the
polity score by one standard deviation, which is around 6 points on a 21-point range, decreases
a countrys probability of adhering to the gold standard by about 1% in the linear probability
model, slightly less than 7% in the probit model, and about 8% in the logit model. While these
e¤ects appear as modest, they are economically signicant. This suggests that political events
such as the French Revolution of 1848, which established the French Second Republic, or the
Young Turk Revolution of 1908, which reinstated the parliament in the Ottoman Empire, can
reduce the chance of a country remaining on the gold standard by 50% as much as the outbreak
of the war.
Among all other regressors, for which the estimated coe¢ cients are statistically insignicant,
the highest marginal e¤ect is estimated for the British ally dummy. For this variable, the implied
marginal e¤ect is similar to that of the polity score. Then come the e¤ects of the population
size, the trade share of the gold bloc and the openness ratio. For the other two variables, the
debt to GDP ratio and the trade balance, the marginal e¤ects are quantitatively very small.
Comparing the marginal e¤ects across the three models we generally see that for all variables
the obtained values are much smaller in the case of the linear probability model than in the
case of the probit and the logit. Given the well-known limitations of the linear probability model
(Horrace & Oaxaca, 2006), we believe that the obtained values in this case should only be treated
as lower bound estimates. Looking at the two non-linear estimators, we see that the computed
marginal e¤ects are similar, although the values obtained in the logit case are slightly higher.
Noting that, as well as the distribution of our dependent variable, in the rest of our analysis we
focus on the probit model and use this as our baseline empirical setup.17
The results reported in Tables 1 and 2 overall suggest that a countrys decision to adopt and
adhere to the gold standard during the rst globalization era, beyond economic considerations,
was also a¤ected by its political institutions. These results echo similar conclusions obtained for
the interwar period by authors such as Wolf and Yousef (2007), Wandschneider (2008) and Wolf
17Following the suggestions by Chen and Tsurumi (2010) and discriminating the models based on the Akaike
information criterion also tends to favor the probit model.
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(2008), as well as for the post-1945 era by Alesina and Wagner (2006) and Bearce and Hallerberg
(2011). Yet, as the polity score is a broad indicator of a countrys form of political organization,
this raises the question of exactly which dimensions of political institutions matter the most for
the choice of a monetary regime. With that in mind, in Table 3 we aim to shed more light on
the mechanism at play in our context by looking at di¤erent components of the polity score and
other indicators of domestic political institutions.18
[Insert Table 3 around here]
In column 1 of Table 3 we replace in our specication the polity score with a dummy variable
indicating whether or not a given country in a given year was a consolidated democracy. This
dummy is obtained from the classication of Boix et al. (2012), as discussed in Section 4. The
empirical setup is otherwise similar to column 2 of Table 1. While this dummy variable is highly
correlated with the polity score and it enters into the specication with a positive coe¢ cient,
the coe¢ cient is statistically insignicant.19 This result suggests that the separation between
political regimes that are democratic and regimes that are not, is not necessarily the crucial one
for gold standard adherence.
A similar conclusion also emerges from a comparison of the estimates reported in columns
2 and 3. In this case the polity score in our baseline specication is replaced by its two sub-
components: the democracy (DEMOC) and the autocracy score (AUTOC), as indicated on
the top of each column.20 In both cases we nd that the estimated coe¢ cients for the two
variables have the expected sign, which is negative for the democracy score and positive for
the autocracy score. Yet, only for the latter variable we nd the estimated coe¢ cient to be
statistically signicant. Taken together the results of columns 1, 2, and 3 imply that our estimated
negative e¤ect for the polity score reects primarily the increased probability of more autocratic
regimes adhering to the gold standard. This suggests that autocratic governments were the ones
most likely to have both the political will and the power to sacrice domestic economic welfare
in the short run in favor of sound money in the longer run.
In the next three columns of Table 3 we replace the overall polity score in our baseline spec-
ication with three distinct sub-component variables reported in the Polity IV database. These
are the executive recruitment index (EXREC ), the executive constraints index (EXCONST ) and
the political competition index (POLCOMP). These indexes are the three constituents parts of
the polity score, but they reect di¤erent aspects of each countrys political institutions. The
rst one reects how competitive, regulated and open the recruitment process is for the countrys
chief executive, i.e. its president, monarch or other ruler. The second reects the presence and
18See Rota (2016) for a similar approach.
19The correlation coe¢ cient within our sample of the democracy dummy and the polity score is around 0.7.
20It should be noted here the polity score reported in the Polity IV database for a given country in a given year
is the di¤erence between the separately computed democracy and autocracy scores.
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extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive. The
third one reects the degree of openness for competition between individuals and parties in the
political arena and the quality of the electoral process.
Looking at the estimated coe¢ cients for these three variables in columns 4, 5 and 6, we see
that for all three we obtain negative coe¢ cients. Thus, the probability of adherence to the gold
standard was lowered by a more regulated form of executive recruitment, more institutionalized
constraints on the executive, and greater political competition. Nevertheless, only the coe¢ cient
on the political competition index is statistically signicant. This suggests that among these
di¤erent aspects of political institutions, it is competition by outsiders that mostly limited the
ability or willingness of policy makers to maintain their commitment to a rigid global monetary
system such as the gold standard.21 This nding also explains the positive relationship between
the autocracy score the gold standard dummy: political competition was clearly limited in auto-
cratic regimes, while constraints on executive recruitment and executive decision-making could
still be present.
6 Robustness Checks
6.1 Robustness to Sample Composition and Econometric Specica-
tion
Having established a clear relationship between the probability of a country adhering to the gold
standard prior to the First World War and key dimensions of its political institutions, we proceed
to assess the robustness of this relationship. Specically we explore how our main results are
a¤ected by (a) changes in the composition of our sample, (b) changes in our specication and
(c) changes to the econometric setup. In all cases we nd our results to be largely una¤ected by
these changes. In this section we present the details.
Table 4 provides a rst key set of robustness checks for our baseline probit specication.
In column 1 we start by exploring the stability of our estimates when we expand the sample
period to the years from 1850 to 1913. This allows us to also capture the determinants of early
entries to the gold standard such as those of Australia, Canada and Portugal. In column 2
we do the opposite and shorten the sample period to the years from 1870 to 1913, the typical
periodization of the classical gold standard. In both cases we nd similar estimates for most
21A notable illustration of this mechanism would be Portugals decision to suspend gold convertibility in 1891,
after a series of capital- and current account shocks. In the words of Reis (2000): In 1891, therefore, there were
only two solutions: violent deation or inconvertibility, in the hope that in time circumstances would allow a
return to gold. Political constraints determined that inconvertibility was chosen(p. 97). On the other hand, in
the case of Japans adoption of the gold standard, Mitchener, Shizume, and Weidenmier (2010) highlight how this
mechanism operate in the opposite way as the support of the opposition was crucial in allowing the government
to push the necessary reforms through the parliament.
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regressors. Looking at the estimated coe¢ cients for the polity score in particular, we see that
they tend to rise as we exclude the years between 1850 and 1870. This result is not surprising
given that most of the transitions in and out of the classical gold standard occur after 1870.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
Having documented that, we turn to explore the robustness of our main results to adjustments
in our country sample. Specically, we consider three variations in this respect. In column 3 we
exclude from our sample the set of core countries. We consider a country to have been a core
member of the gold standard, if during this period it participated actively in the Atlantic economy
(ORourke & Williamson, 1999). Table A1 in the Appendix details for every country whether
we consider it part of the core or the periphery.22 Restricting our sample to non-core countries,
does not qualitatively alter our main result. Quantitatively, though, it leads to a doubling of the
coe¢ cient estimate for the polity score.23 This suggests that the political constraints that we are
highlighting here were particularly important for peripheral countries for which commitment to
the gold standard was not as rm as for core countries. This result is in line with the ndings
of Morys (2013) and Mitchener and Weidenmier (2015) regarding di¤erences in the operation of
the gold standard between the core and the periphery.
In column 4 we proceed to exclude from our sample the countries that there were part of a
monetary union when joining the gold standard. These were the members of the Latin Monetary
Union (Belgium, France and Switzerland) and the Scandinavian Monetary Union (Denmark,
Norway and Sweden).24 The rationale for doing so is that adherence to the gold standard for
these countries involved some degree of o¢ cial coordination with other countries. Hence, they
were subject to constraints that extended beyond the domestic economic and political conditions.
In column 5 we instead exclude from the sample Britain and its o¤shoots. Britain had a long
history of commitment to the gold standard and the convertibility of the pound was beyond
doubt.25 In both cases we see that excluding these countries leads to qualitatively similar results
while the coe¢ cient estimate for the polity score again increases slightly. This suggests that our
main result is strengthened as we focus on countries for which domestic political constraints were
more relevant and for which a commitment to the classical gold standard was more questionable.
Turning to column 6, we explore the importance of additional variables that relate to the
conduct of monetary policy in each country. These variables reect the nature of the monetary
22An alternative to this would be to classify as core countries those countries that were able to borrow abroad in
their own currency, a clear sign that international nancial markets trusted their adherence to the gold standard.
Using this criterion instead would lead to roughly the same set of core countries.
23In terms of the corresponding marginal e¤ect, a one standard deviation increase in polity score is now
associated with a 12% decrease in the probability of adherence to the gold standard.
24Italy left the Latin Monetary Union in 1868, well before France adopted the gold standard, and is therefore
best seen as monetarily independent for most of the period. See also Tattara (2003).
25Additionally, as pointed out by Daunton (2006), the gold standard enjoyed wide popular support in Britain.
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authorities, captured by a dummy variable indicating the presence of a central bank, the resources
available to the monetary authorities to maintain a commitment to the gold standard, captured
by the coverage ratio, and the overall price stability, captured by the ination rate. Note that
their inclusion in column 6 leads to a substantial drop in our number of observations from 1259
to 961.
Looking at the estimates in this case we see that the inclusion of these additional variables
does not alter our main nding. The coe¢ cient estimates for the main determinants of gold
standard adherence are similar. Most importantly, the estimate for the polity score continues
to be negative and statistically signicant. This result implies that even when we control for
di¤erences in the specic monetary conditions that each country faced, the political constraints
that we have already identied still have an e¤ect on the probability of the country adhering to
the gold standard.
Having reported these robustness checks for our baseline probit specication, in Table 5 we
explore robustness with respect to our econometric setup. A rst check, which we report in
column 1, is to add further lags of the polity score to our specication. The idea behind the
addition of further lags is to assess whether the estimated e¤ect of the polity score is mostly
a reection of current political institutions or of those of the past. With that in mind we also
control for the second and third lag of the polity score beyond the rst one. Doing so reduces
the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient for the rst lag, as was to be expected, given that the
lagged values for the di¤erent years are highly correlated. Despite their high correlation we nd
that the estimated coe¢ cient for the rst lag is still larger in magnitude than the other two. This
indicates that our estimated e¤ect captures indeed a short-term e¤ect of the current political
environment.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
In addition to time lags we also consider the role of spatial lags. This is because the decision
of each country to adopt and adhere to the gold standard is likely to be closely related to the
decisions of other countries with which there is a high degree of economic interaction.26 These
countries could be close neighbors as well as large trade partners. Part of this e¤ect, of course,
is already captured by controlling for openness and the share of trade with the bloc of gold
standard countries. Yet, as these variables may not reect the full extent of spatial interaction,
in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 we add to our specication a spatial lag of the gold standard
dummy to capture interactions that operate beyond the trade channel. Specically, in column
2 we include in our specication the lagged gold-standard status of each countrys ve nearest
neighbors from the sample, while in column 3 we include the lagged gold-standard status of each
countrys ve largest trade partners from the sample.
26This type of interdependence has also been analyzed recently by Esteves and Ploeckl (2016) using empirical
network analysis.
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In both cases we nd that the inclusion of these spatial lags does not alter our main ndings.
Our main variable of interest, the polity score, retains its magnitude and statistical signicance.
The same is true for the other signicant controls. Moreover, we see that neither the lagged gold
standard status of each countrys nearest neighbors nor that of its largest trade partners has a
statistically signicant e¤ect on its probability of adhering to the gold standard. This suggests
that, beyond the e¤ects already captured by our main controls, the role of spatial interactions
in the decisions of countries to participate in the gold standard was limited.
Another important check to consider is what happens to our results when we extend beyond
our binary gold standard classication. While our baseline classication does not distinguish
between monetary systems based on silver or bimetallism, and systems based on at money,
these systems are materially di¤erent. With that mind, in next columns of Table 5 we re-
estimate our baseline specication using two alternative dependent variables. The rst of these,
in column 4, is dummy variable indicating adherence to any convertible monetary regime gold,
silver or bimetallicversus having an inconvertible paper money regime. The second alternative
dependent variable is an ordinal measure of monetary systems, similar to that of Esteves and
Ploeckl (2016), with the gold standard being of the highest order (4) followed by a bimetallic
standard (3), a silver standard (2) and nally an inconvertible paper money regime (1). In the
latter case, thus, we estimate an ordered probit model which uses this ordinal measure but is
otherwise similar to the binary choice model of equation 1.
The estimation in both cases reveals qualitatively similar results. The same factors predicting
adherence to the gold standard appear to predict also adherence to convertible monetary systems
more generally. In particular, we see that our main variable of interest, the polity score, continues
to have a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on the probability of adherence to any
convertible regime monetary regime. Comparing the coe¢ cient estimates with our baseline
probit specication from Table 1, we see that the estimated coe¢ cient for the polity in both
columns 4 and 5 is a bit smaller. This suggests that political constraints may have been less
important for silver and bimetallic regimes. Yet, given the more exible nature of these regimes,
this result is not entirely surprising. Looking at the estimated coe¢ cients for the other variables,
we see that the coe¢ cient of GDP per capita is substantially smaller in column 4. This suggests
that a countrys level of development mattered less for adherence to silver and bimetallic regimes
conrming the particular attractiveness of the gold standard for more developed economies, as
discussed in Section 2.
A nal part in our robustness analysis is to also consider the potential endogeneity bias
that may be present in our estimated coe¢ cient for the polity score. This bias could be due
to the fact that the polity score is an imperfect measure of the domestic political institutions.
Alternatively, a bias may arise from the omission of other important determinants of the gold
standard adherence that may be correlated with the polity score. To correct for this potential
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bias, we pursue an instrumental variable strategy where we use two instruments for the polity
score: (a) the number of years since each country e¤ectively became an independent polity and
(b) an index of the state antiquity of each country provided by Bockstette et al. (2002).
Both instruments should capture the fact that countries which have longer histories as in-
dependent or autonomous polities are bound to have political institutions which were formed
in the past. Because of the high degree of persistence of political institutions, such institutions
are bound to be more autocratic. On the other hand, countries that became independent more
recently, will tend to have more modern political institutions and to be more democratic. Either
way, these two variables are bound to correlate with contemporary political institutions of each
country, which are reected in the polity score of each country. Yet, they should not relate to the
probability of each country adhering to the gold standard, which was a monetary arrangement
that only emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century, beyond their indirect e¤ect via
the countrys political institutions.
Using this instrumentation strategy, we re-estimate our baseline probit specication in column
6 where instead of the actual polity score we use the predicted one from the rst stage regression
reported in column 7. As the second-stage estimates reveal, the instrumented polity score still has
a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on the probability of adherence to the gold standard
controlling for all other baseline controls. The estimated coe¢ cient in this case is smaller than the
one reported in Table 1 which suggests the presence of some of endogeneity bias. Nevertheless,
the estimated magnitude of the e¤ect remains quantitatively important, which suggests that even
when accounting for this bias, higher values of the polity score still have a negative e¤ect on the
probability of a country adhering to the gold standard.
Inspecting the rst stage estimates in column 7 also conrms the strength and the validity
of the instruments. Both instruments enter signicantly in the rst stage and the estimated
coe¢ cient is negative in line with the intuition expressed above. Countries in our sample with
longer histories as independent states and generally discounted state histories, such as Austria-
Hungary, China, Japan, Russia and the Ottoman Empire, tended to have lower polity scores
compared to newly established states in this era such as Argentina, Belgium Canada, Greece and
the United States. Moreover, the joint F-test for the validity of the instruments yields a value
of 19.4 which is safely above the critical threshold of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).
Similarly, the Sargant test of over-identifying restrictions suggests that assuming the validity of
at least one of the instruments should not lead to rejection of the validity of the other.
6.2 Separating Adoption and Suspension Decisions
Having established the robustness of our main results regarding the decision of countries to
adhere to the gold standard, we now turn to investigate separately the role of domestic political
institutions in the process of adoption and suspension of the gold standard. For this purpose
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we estimate hazard ratios, based on the Cox proportional hazard model of equation 2, for the
decision to adopt the gold standard and for the opposite decision to suspend it.
Since a country can only adopt the gold standard if it is currently using an alternative
monetary system, the set of countries that are subject to a hazard of adoption in every year
corresponds to those countries which do not yet adhere to the gold standard. The opposite is
true for the case of gold standard suspension: only those countries already using the gold standard
are subject to a hazard of suspension. Given that, the number of observations based on which
we perform our estimation in these two setups is substantially smaller than in our baseline probit
setup. In the context of this analysis we, furthermore, need to clarify how to treat countries that
drop out of the sample following an adoption or suspension decision. In the case of the adoption
setup, for example, a country leaves the sample once it has joined the gold standard. The same
country, however, may end up in the future being subject to a renewed hazard of adoption, if
in the meantime it ends up leaving the gold standard. As a priori it is not certain whether the
determinants of adoption are similar for countries that have previously used the gold standard
to those who never have, we estimate two versions of each hazard ratio: one based on all cases
of adoptions or suspensions and one that leaves countries out of the risk-set permanently after
the initial adoptions or suspensions.27 Beyond these adjustments to our sample, we also stratify
the sample into a core and a periphery group of countries, based on the classication reported
in Table A1, to account for potential di¤erences in the baseline hazard rates between these two
groups of countries.
The estimates of the hazard ratios for the adoption and suspension decisions based on this
empirical setup are presented in Table 6. The rst four columns of the table report results for
the adoption decision and the last two columns do so for the suspension decision.28 Columns
1 and 2 provide the estimates for the hazard ratios from a specication of the adoption setup
that includes all our control variables. The di¤erence between the two specications is that in
column 2 we allow countries that rst adopted and then suspended the gold standard to re-
enter our sample. In both cases the obtained coe¢ cient estimates tell a similar story as our
main regression results from Table 1. The variables that were positively associated with the
probability of adhering to the gold standard have estimated hazard ratios above 1. Similarly the
variables that were negatively associated with the probability of adhering to the gold standard
have estimated hazard ratios below 1. Our main variable of interest, the polity score, has an
estimated hazard ratio of about 0.9. This hazard ratio is also statistically signicant.29
27A related question here is about the e¤ect that a previous participation in the gold standard system might
have on the likelihood of re-adoption. Unfortunately, though, the number of cases in which a country adopts or
suspends twice is far too limited to analyze this systematically.
28As in our baseline specication, we have lagged all regressors by one year. Thus, our estimates reects how a
change in any of the regressors in a given year would alter the hazard rate of a country adopting or suspending
the gold standard during the next year.
29In terms of magnitude, our estimates are quantitatively larger than our baseline probit results: a one-point
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[Insert Table 6 around here]
Since the number of cases in which a country suspended the gold standard before 1914 was
fairly limited  there are nine cases in our sample  we cannot include all the independent
variables when estimating the Cox model for suspensions, since the model would become over-
specied. For this reason, in the specication of the suspension setup we omit those controls that
have so far not shown up as statistically signicant. Beyond the polity score, the specication
therefore includes as only controls the war and British ally dummy variables, GDP per capita,
and population. For the sake of comparison between the adoption and suspension setups, we also
rst estimate the former using only these control variables. The results are shown in columns
3 and 4. Doing so leads to di¤erent estimated hazard rates for some of the control variables.
Interestingly, however, this does not alter the estimated hazard rates for the polity score. In
column 3 we marginally lose statistical signicance, but other than that the estimated hazard
rate for the polity score is consistently around 0.9 in all adoption setups.
In columns 5 and 6 we provide the corresponding estimates for the suspension setup. As a
result of the small number of suspensions, most coe¢ cient estimates are statistically insignicant.
Nevertheless we do nd qualitatively symmetric results for those variables that were generally
signicant in the our probit regressions: war and GDP per capita. Moreover, for our main variable
of interest, the polity score, we nd that higher values are associated with an increased hazard
of suspension. This appears qualitatively in line with our hypothesis, although the estimated
hazard rates vary between the two versions of the exit model and condence intervals are wide.
The results of Table 6 suggest some degree of symmetry in the determinants of gold standard
adoption and suspension decisions. Estimating the exact hazard rates attributed to di¤erent
factors with a satisfactory level of precision is hard, particularly in the case of suspensions.
This is most likely due to the fact that the number of suspensions was fairly limited before
1914. By and large, however, the estimates that we obtain are consistent with our hypothesis
that participation in the gold standard was, ceteris paribus, more di¢ cult for countries where
domestic political institutions were more open and democratic.
7 Conclusion
In the extensive literature on the classical gold standard the decision of countries to participate in
the system is often analyzed in purely economic terms with the countries balancing the economic
benets in terms of trade and access to capital markets against the costs in terms of monetary
and scal policy independence. The analysis presented in this paper highlights an alternative
political economy mechanism that a¤ected the decision of countries to participate in the classical
increase in the polity score is now associated with a decrease in the hazard of gold standard adoption of 10%.
They are also estimated with a smaller degree of precision. This is largely, though, due to sample e¤ects.
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gold standard. For the period between 1860 and 1913, during which many countries saw a gradual
extension of the franchise and an increase in democratization, we provide evidence that adherence
to the gold standard was, other things equal, less likely in countries where domestic politics were
organized in a more open and democratic fashion. This e¤ect, which is typically associated
only with the interwar period, is shown to be robust to changes in the sample composition and
across di¤erent econometric specications. It also appears quantitatively relevant. Controlling
for various economic factors, a one standard deviation increase in the polity score of a country is
associated in our baseline specication with a decrease of 7% in the likelihood of gold standard
adherence.
Exploring further the pattern behind the main result, we see that the constraining factor
regarding the ability of a country to adhere to the gold standard was not having a democratic
political system per se, but particular aspects associated with democratic politics. Looking at
the three key components of the polity score, related to the executive recruitment process, to
constraints on the executive and to the extent of political competition, we see that only the
last one has a negative and statistically signicant relationship with gold standard adherence.
Moreover, comparing the presence of autocratic versus democratic political institutions, we nd
that it is primarily the presence of the former that facilitates adherence to the gold standard.
Finally, when separating the processes of gold standard adoption and suspension, we nd that
higher values for the polity score not only decrease the probability of adoption but also appear
to increase the probability of suspension.
Synthesizing these results suggests that adherence to the gold standard was largely facilitated
by institutions that su¢ ciently shielded the government from pressures of public opinion and
populist movements that opposed the system. These pressures were important for policy makers
in charge of managing each countrys membership to this globally monetary regime, as they were
forced to weigh this commitment against other, domestic, economic objectives. Naturally such
pressures were stronger in countries where the political systems was organized in a democratic
fashion. Yet, overall the evidence presented in this paper suggest that it was political competition
rather than democratic political institutions per se that jeopardized a credible commitment to
the gold standard.
What bearings do these ndings have on policy issues in the present era? Would a revived gold
standard be a feasible option for the international monetary system in the twenty-rst century,
as some have advocated? For this system to be credible in the eyes of international nancial
markets, it should require long-term commitments by policy makers to exchange rate stability,
scal discipline and limited control over monetary policy. In democratically organized societies
this implies that any government making these commitments would have to tie the hands of all
future governments. As our results highlight, such a commitment may appear less credible in
an evolving political environment where outsiders are free to challenge incumbent politicians in
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contestable elections.
The aforementioned long-term commitments to exchange rate stability, scal discipline and
limited control over monetary policy, however, do apply currently to the countries participating
in the European Monetary Union (EMU). As a consequence of these commitments national gov-
ernments of member states have limited exibility in the design of their economic policies. These
policy limits have become particularly relevant in the aftermath of the global nancial crisis, as
the trade-o¤between external and internal stability within the monetary union has become more
acute. At the same time the domestic politics of the EMUs member states are organized in a
democratic fashion. In the face of rising populism, democratically elected governments of EMU
member states have so far shown occasional reluctance to make the reforms necessary to ensure
external stability within the monetary union. This echoes our result that, under the classical
gold standard, democratic governments were less likely to make similar commitments than their
more autocratic counterparts. Thus, the important lesson from the experience of the classical
gold standard in the EMU context is that the design of policy within the monetary union should
acknowledge the constraints imposed by national politics on the policy commitments and the
plans for reforms. Failing to do so may end up compromising democratic politics in member
states or triggering an otherwise undesirable exit from the monetary union.
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1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1918
No. of countries adhering to the Gold Standard (left axis)
Avg. global Polity Score (right axis)
Table 1: Determinants of Gold Standard Adherence
Linear Probit Logit
Polity Score -0.00171* -0.0307** -0.0690**
(0.000856) (0.0148) (0.0349)
War -0.0196** -0.499*** -1.031**
(0.00895) (0.168) (0.427)
British Ally 0.0134 0.204 0.508
(0.0108) (0.155) (0.359)
GDP per capita (log) 0.0516*** 0.952*** 2.163***
(0.0105) (0.192) (0.469)
Population (log) 0.00254 0.0794 0.162
(0.00393) (0.0742) (0.174)
Debt to GDP 0.000803 -0.0130 -0.0590
(0.0145) (0.234) (0.586)
Openness 0.00503 0.115 0.367
(0.0100) (0.197) (0.504)
Trade Share with Gold Block 0.0167 0.349 0.887
(0.0358) (0.592) (1.340)
Trade Balance to GDP 0.0603 -0.212 0.867
(0.105) (1.891) (4.635)
Gold Standard (t-1) 0.919*** 3.817*** 7.235***
(0.0141) (0.208) (0.524)
Constant -0.367*** -9.667*** -21.28***
(0.110) (2.008) (4.929)
Observations 1,259 1,259 1,259
Countries 30 30 30
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.905 0.854 0.854
Estimates of the baseline specification using linear probability,
probit and logit models for the full country sample, spanning the
period 1860-1913. The dependent variable is a dummy variable
indicating adherence to the Gold Standard in the corresponding
year. All regressors are lagged by one year. The specifications
also include decade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the country-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2: Marginal Effects for Baseline Specifications
St. Dev. Linear Probit Logit
Polity Score 6.169 -1.06%* -6.66%** -8.10%**
War – -1.96%** -17.56%*** -19.62%**
British Ally – 1.34% 7.19% 9.66%
GDP per capita (log) 0.586 3.02%*** 19.64%*** 24.12%***
Population (log) 1.425 0.36% 3.99% 4.39%
Debt to GDP 0.410 0.03% -0.19% -0.46%
Openness 0.403 0.20% 1.64% 2.81%
Trade Share with Gold Block 0.268 0.45% 3.29% 4.52%
Trade Balance to GDP 0.068 0.41% -0.51% 1.12%
Gold Standard (t-1) – 91.85%*** 134.36%*** 137.68%***
Marginal effects at the mean for each regressor, based on the estimates shown in
Table 1. Numbers represent the increase in probability of adherence to the Gold
Standard in a given year following an increase by one standard deviation of the
respective regressor for the continuous independent variables, and for an increase
from zero to one for the dummy variables. Statistical significance as per table 1:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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